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Staffing issues

  1. The Inquiry identified a number of issues relating to staffing, both by G4S and the Home Office, including inadequate staffing levels, problems with recruitment and retention, insufficient training and development, and ineffective management.

Inadequate staffing

  1. The Inquiry heard that those working at Brook House were aware of concerns around staffing, even when the centre was fully staffed. Many witnesses described insufficient staffing levels during the relevant period. Staff reported that two Detention Custody Officers (DCOs) per residential wing was insufficient.1 At times there might in fact have been only one DCO per wing.2 Detention Custody Manager (DCM) Shane Farrell recalled that overtime was available most days and “everyone knew” about the staffing issues.3
  2. Witnesses also told the Inquiry that Brook House was dangerous due to understaffing.4 Staff felt unable to provide necessary and basic services.5 For example, at times, courtyards could not be opened and activities could not be provided.6 When wings were understaffed, the Inquiry heard that Activities officers would cover any shortfalls.7
  3. It was suggested by some that understaffing was a conscious decision by G4S.

7.1 Ms Sarah Newland, Head of Tinsley House IRC during the relevant period, said her view (as previously recorded in the 2018 Verita report) was that understaffing at Brook House was an intentional choice made “in order to attain the profit”, and involved a manipulation of true staffing figures to reduce the level of financial penalties.8

7.2 Mr Daniel Haughton, G4S Support Services Manager during the relevant period and now Assistant Director of Safeguarding, recalled a conscious decision by Mr Ben Saunders (Centre Director for Brook House and Tinsley House (Gatwick IRCs) during the relevant period) “to run staffing levels below the typical headcount” in preparation for the upcoming contract renewal.9 The renewed contract that came into force in May 2018 provided for fewer staff, although the number of staff increased in the wake of the Panorama programme. Mr Haughton believed that, during the relevant period, there was a decision not to recruit to the target number so that Brook House was maintaining a lower level of staff consistent with the new contract. He noted that this decision was “financially beneficial9 but created unnecessary pressure on staff and compounded general difficulties.10 As a result, an Initial Training Course (ITC) planned for an intake of 30 to 50 new recruits, involving weeks of planning, would either not go ahead or be run with very few trainees.11

7.3 Mr Saunders told the Inquiry that he had never instructed anyone not to recruit up to the contractual headcount.12 He accepted that staff were moved from Tinsley House to Brook House but said that this was primarily for operational reasons, and that avoiding financial penalties was not the primary benefit.13

7.4 Mr Peter Neden, G4S Regional President UK and Ireland during the relevant period, disagreed that Brook House was consciously understaffed but accepted that Brook House was “particularly struggling” to reach intended staffing levels.14 He suggested that understaffing would not be a “sensible model”, as it would lead to higher staff turnover and increased overtime payments.15

  1. Mr Saunders stated that the staffing position was discussed regularly with the Home Office.12 Mr Neden told the Inquiry that G4S and the Home Office were “content” with the staffing levels.16 He suggested that the Home Office was content that G4S had covered shifts adequately despite attrition rates, although he did not recall being made aware of the times when G4S failed to meet the contractual levels.17 Mr Haughton did not recall staffing levels being raised as a performance issue in his meetings with the Home Office.18 He suggested that it would have been for the Home Office to amend the contract if they had wanted more staff, although he agreed that G4S could have asked for an amendment too.19
  2. Mr Ian Castle, Home Office Detention and Escorting Services (DES) Area Manager for Gatwick IRCs during the relevant period, described the G4S staffing levels as inadequate at that time from a Home Office perspective. However, he said:

“I did not raise any concerns … as I did not think that increasing staff levels was an available option due to contractual and budget constraints. I also believed that they were already aware of the issues and I assumed that they were part of the discussions around staffing levels.”20

  1. The evidence reviewed by the Inquiry suggested a lack of appreciation by G4S and the Home Office of the need (both contractual and practical) for adequate staffing, and a failure to address concerns that were raised about staffing levels. There was no evidence of a proper evaluation, by G4S or the Home Office, of whether the level of staffing met the needs of Brook House, or of the benefit of a dynamic approach to staffing levels to meet the needs of a changeable population. Mr Jeremy Petherick, Managing Director of G4S Custodial and Detention Services during the relevant period, acknowledged in hindsight the benefits of a more flexible approach to staffing levels.21
  2. The basis upon which appropriate staffing levels were determined was unclear (although, as discussed in Chapter D.2, there were concerns at the initial procurement stage over the staffing levels proposed by most bidders, including both Global Solutions Ltd and G4S). It is therefore difficult to say whether contractually prescribed levels were adequate. In any event, it is clear that the actual staffing levels achieved by G4S were insufficient for much of the relevant period, as those working at Brook House (from both G4S and the Home Office) were aware.22 There appears to have been no attempt by G4S to exceed contractually prescribed minimum levels (although this would have reduced the profit margin) or to renegotiate the contract to provide for more staff, or by the Home Office to require increased staff to ensure the order and safety of Brook House. Despite this, the renewed contract agreed in 2018 between G4S and the Home Office was intended to provide even lower staffing levels.23 It was only following the Panorama programme that this changed, when G4S’s action plan included increasing staff numbers.24
  3. The Serco contract allows for significantly higher minimum staff numbers at Brook House than during the relevant period.25) Ms Mary Molyneux (who was Chair of the Independent Monitoring Board at Brook House (Brook House IMB) after the relevant period and is a current member of the Gatwick IRCs IMB), described the increased staffing levels as “the biggest improvement and the biggest change” compared with the relevant period. However, she noted that Serco was “beginning to have retention issues again as the airport reopens” and added that, at the time of giving her evidence, Brook House was running at half capacity due to Covid-19 measures:

“Numbers are going to go up. Serco, even if they are fully staffed, have a lot of highly inexperienced staff under those conditions. So that is a concern; they acknowledge it.”26

  1. Insufficient staffing levels had a detrimental – and sometimes significant – impact on safety, as well as resulting in detained people being unable to access services and activities to which they were entitled. This led to frustration towards staff. My view is that staff, in turn, saw detained people and their needs as problems rather than the reason why the staff were there.27
  2. The impact of understaffing was recognised by some witnesses.28 Adequate staffing levels are critical to ensure that there is an ordered and safe environment for detained people, staff and others in immigration removal centres. I am therefore recommending that the Home Office and those managing IRCs undertake regular and ongoing assessments of staffing levels.
Recommendation 23: Ongoing assessment of staffing levels

The Home Office and contractors operating immigration removal centres must ensure that there is ongoing assessment of staffing levels (at least on a quarterly basis), so that the level of staff present within each centre is appropriate for the size and needs of the detained population.

The Home Office must also ensure that the detained population does not increase at any immigration centre unless staffing is at an adequate level.

Inadequate recruitment and retention of staff

  1. Recruitment was an ongoing issue at Brook House prior to and during the relevant period. Minutes from G4S’s Senior Management Team (SMT) meetings in 2016 demonstrated concerns about vacancies and pressure to recruit new staff due to the number of staff leaving.29 In that year, 81 staff left. Mr Lee Hanford, Interim Director of Gatwick IRCs in 2016 and again in 2017–18 following the Panorama programme, reported that around six to eight DCOs resigned each month.30 In 2017, a total of 75 staff members left, including those who left or were dismissed following the Panorama programme.31
  2. Various efforts were made to recruit new staff, such as local press advertisements, publication on the G4S Global Career Centre website and recruitment days.32 Despite this, Mr Saunders described multiple challenges in relation to staff recruitment, including that positions with better rates of pay were available at Gatwick Airport.33
  3. The requirement for staff to be cleared by the Home Office also reduced the potential cohort of staff.34 The Inquiry heard that the “pipeline for recruits” was variable.35 The Inquiry also heard that, while staff numbers would increase following a recruitment drive, numbers would drop quite quickly. DCO Owen Syred (who was also Welfare Officer during the relevant period), told the Inquiry, “there was never a period when there was prolonged stability”.36 New staff were primarily trained and assessed off site. Mr Haughton recalled it being difficult to evaluate whether an individual would be successful in a role due to “the unique nature of the environment” at Brook House.37 It is of fundamental importance that people are appropriately recruited and subject not only to adequate initial training (considered below) but also to continuing development.
  4. Retention was also an issue. DCM Steven Dix recalled new staff starting frequently but said that “there was an issue with retaining staff”, particularly on the wings. He suggested that allowing new recruits onto wings before the ITC could give a more realistic impression of the job and “weed out” those who were unlikely to continue.38 A number of witnesses told the Inquiry that the DCO recruitment and training process did not give a realistic picture of what the job was like or prepare them fully for the role.39 They recalled that other DCOs had reported feeling unprepared and, in some cases, left during or soon after the ITC due to feeling ill equipped for the reality of the work.40 DCO Luke Instone-Brewer recalled that, when applying for the job, he believed it was at Gatwick Airport “stamping passports and the like”.41 DCO Charles Francis believed that, after the ITC, when DCOs shadowed a colleague within Brook House, “reality hits … it’s then you think ‘is this for me? Do I need this?’”.42
  5. In the DCO role, G4S provided limited incentives for long service.43 Mr Syred noted a “lack of recognition and reward for experience”, which he associated with high turnover, a failure to recruit people interested in a long- term career, and the stresses of the role. He estimated that, when he returned to Brook House in 2014 after a year away, approximately three-quarters of the staff were new.44 It is likely that high turnover affected the morale of those who remained.45
  6. There were also no financial rewards provided by G4S for taking on additional DCO responsibilities, such as becoming an Assessment Care in Detention and Teamwork (ACDT) assessor.46 Despite his important Welfare Officer role and his 10 years of service, Mr Syred was earning the same as a new DCO with no experience. His only option for career progression was to become a DCM, which he did not wish to do.47 Related to retention was the working pattern of the detention staff. Some current and former members of staff told the Inquiry (and had previously told Verita) that the long shifts and shift patterns could be stressful and exhausting, and could negatively affect their mental health and their personal and family lives.48 The combination of this with the insufficient staffing levels clearly does not excuse ill treatment of detained people, but it is likely that stress, fatigue and the feeling of being overworked and understaffed exacerbated the poor staff culture.
  7. Some painted a more positive picture of working life in Brook House and explained that morale levels were variable (by time, between staff or between areas of Brook House).49 However, the Inquiry repeatedly heard staff members describe poor morale during the relevant period. It was described as dropping into an “abyss”,50 while “sickness was through the roof. People didn’t want to turn up for work.51 This low morale was specifically attributed by many to low staffing levels and a high turnover.52 DCO Daniel Lake told the Inquiry:

“You come in and see the rota straight away and realise how many people are in the building and straight away you’re on the back burner, you think, ‘Oh, it’s going to be a long day’. Yeah, that’s why morale was mostly down, was staffing reasons.”53

Mr Callum Tulley, a DCO until July 2017, said that the majority of staff were “trying to do their best in a bleak, poorly staffed, highly charged and toxic environment”.54

  1. There were obvious pressures on an understaffed and insufficiently capable workforce at Brook House during the relevant period, working in an inherently challenging environment. A number of DCOs and DCMs were inherently unsuitable for those roles. Along with the need to recruit appropriate employees to maintain a quality workforce and encourage a positive culture, I consider that high levels of turnover contributed to a negative staff culture. The impact of low staffing levels also increased stress and pressure on those remaining. In my view, these issues made the environment difficult for most staff and exacerbated unacceptable behaviour by some.
  2. Changes have been made since the relevant period. The DCO role has been reduced to a 40 hour per week position, from 46 hours during the relevant period. This change came into force in July 2018 as part of G4S’s action plan55 and was retained for the Serco contract. Following a pay review finalised on 1 April 2022, the salary for the DCO role was increased to £27,441, “above any other IRC salary”.56) Turnover was “about ten leavers a month”, and the Inquiry was told those vacancies were being filled with active recruitment.57 Nonetheless, Mr Haughton told the Inquiry that, while Serco had “improved conditions for staff”, competition with better paid and less pressured roles would always remain.58

Inadequate development of staff

  1. The content of staff training was set by G4S, although its plan was approved by the Home Office.59 All DCOs employed at Brook House during the relevant period were required to complete the ITC before being certified by the Home Office and allowed to engage in DCO duties.60 This included training in Control and Restraint (C&R, discussed in Chapter D.7), personal protection, first aid, ACDT, health and safety, and safeguarding and security, and lasted six weeks with a further two-week period for shadowing an existing member of staff.61 In addition, staff received some ongoing training such as annual refresher courses on security and safer custody.62
  2. Some staff spoke positively about their experiences on the ITC.63 However, the 2018 Verita report “had cause to question the quality and content” of some of the training offered on the ITC and in refresher courses, and found that not all of those delivering training were appropriately qualified.64 G4S disputed this, despite a review in 2018 identifying certain gaps and inconsistencies in its training.65 Professor Bosworth considered that DCO training was inadequate and had too much emphasis on security.66 For example, C&R and first aid were the only elements of the ITC that prospective staff explicitly needed to pass in order to have contact with detained people.67
  3. There were also a number of areas in which there was insufficient or no training.

25.1 Mental health: A number of witnesses told the Inquiry that there was a lack of mental health training during or prior to the relevant period, although the ITC contained an introduction to mental health and first aid training.68One consequence of this was that detained people with mental health conditions were sometimes dismissed as simply behaving badly.69) Adequate training is necessary for staff working at Brook House to understand and respond to detained people with mental health conditions, as has been identified in various reports.70)

25.2 Working with vulnerable detained people: Some staff felt that there was a particular failure to provide those who worked on E Wing (where detained people with particular vulnerabilities were held) with sufficient training to deal with various issues arising among detained people, including drug misuse and other types of vulnerability.71 Professor Bosworth considered that, although the Home Office’s statutory Guidance on Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention (Adults at Risk policy), which is discussed further in Chapter D.5, was in place during the relevant period, it was likely that it was not widely understood and there was little evidence of staff being trained on it.72

25.3 Use of force: A number of staff felt that the training they received on use of force was good.73) However, there appears to have been no training on particular factors that need to be taken into account when using force against, for example, people with mental ill health.74 The adequacy of use of force training is considered in more detail in Chapter D.7.

25.4 DCM training: While DCOs tended to be recruited externally, the majority of DCMs were – and still are – recruited from the DCO level. The Inquiry heard from various witnesses that when DCOs were promoted to DCM level, they did not receive adequate training for their increased responsibilities. At most, they would shadow a DCM for a short time.75 Mr Jonathan Collier, the Inquiry’s use of force expert, described this as “wholly inadequate”.76 This risks poor culture and practices being passed on and is illustrative of the lack of professionalisation of these roles. Professor Bosworth suggested that the Home Office run DCO training, working with contractors and other stakeholders, including HM Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP), the IMB and representatives from detained people, and emphasised the need to revisit the DCO role with an emphasis on care over security.77) These suggestions should be considered by the Home Office and private providers when designing staff training.

Better training on these matters would have helped staff to implement requirements more appropriately.

  1. Professor Bosworth reviewed some of the staff training materials currently in place under Serco’s management of Brook House. She noted that, while there was training in matters such as human rights and interpersonal skills, the course was skewed heavily towards security and risk, as it had been during the relevant period.78 The human rights training was significantly out of date and was a missed opportunity to link, for example, the explanation of Articles 3 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to the rights of those detained in an IRC. The speaker notes suggested some confusion about the scope and purpose of Article 3. Insufficient weight was placed on the rights of detained people, while there was too much focus on the dangers of working in an IRC and on the use of force.79
  2. The consequence of inadequate training and development during the relevant period was that staff were left unprepared and unable to do their jobs properly, particularly in relation to vulnerable detained people. Staff do not, for example, need to be mental health experts, but they should have an understanding of how mental health conditions might affect behaviour and how they should respond.
  3. In my opinion, being a DCO is a job that demands a complex combination of skills, including resilience, compassion, strength and authority. The role is, if anything, even more challenging and complicated than that of a prison officer, given the language barriers and the difficulty in forming relationships with people detained for an uncertain and relatively short-term duration. I am therefore recommending that the training provided to detention staff be improved – it should be at least equivalent in depth and breadth to that received by prison officers.
Recommendation 24: Mandatory training for immigration removal centre staff

The Home Office, in conjunction with contractors, must ensure that all relevant immigration removal centre staff receive mandatory introductory and annual training on:

●  mental health;
●  race and diversity;
●  a trauma-informed approach;
●  their own resilience;
●  drug awareness; and
●  the purpose of immigration removal centres.

This training must include the perspectives of, or be conducted in consultation with, detained people.

The Home Office must also ensure, in conjunction with contractors, that new joiners must start on probation on completion of introductory training and be adequately supervised for a period of time as necessary to establish their competence to work independently.

Ineffective management by G4S Senior Management Team

  1. In an institution like Brook House, the SMT is responsible for setting, monitoring and maintaining a healthy culture. If senior managers are absent or ineffective, there is a risk of deterioration in culture and standards. This was the case under the management by G4S of Brook House during the relevant period.
  2. Many staff who gave evidence to the Inquiry felt that the SMT was “not visible”, “barely visible”, “rarely seen or heard” around Brook House, insufficiently accessible and “notoriously unavailable”.80 Some DCOs and DCMs stated that they received “no back-up from senior management”,81 who were perceived to inhabit an “ivory tower”,82 removed from daily life in Brook House. Mr Saunders agreed that he could have been more visible, but said that a key element of his role was “reporting upwards”.83 Mr Stephen Skitt (Deputy Director of Brook House during the relevant period) saw himself as having been “relatively visible”,84 while Mr Julian Williams (Residential Manager) considered himself to be more present on the wings than other managers.((Julian Williams 16 March 2022 29/7-20) DCO Edmund Fiddy described “a nice atmosphere at the top of the building” where the Home Office and SMT were based, which was quiet and “didn’t feel like a prison”.85
  3. The Inquiry also heard evidence of dysfunctional relationships within the SMT. Mr Saunders said he felt “isolated” in his role and was distrustful of some SMT members.86 Mr Haughton suggested that Mr Saunders was “shouted down” by SMT members when Mr Haughton raised compliance issues, although Mr Saunders denied this.87
  4. As Professor Bosworth also noted, the G4S contract created a significant pay gap between the SMT and DCOs. The steep hierarchy was compounded by shift patterns that meant that there were long periods with limited SMT (and indeed DCM) presence.88
  5. The lack of presence and visibility of SMT members, and their hierarchical separation from those ‘on the ground’, likely contributed to a feeling that the DCOs and DCMs were largely left to manage on their own ‘against’ the detained people, with their actions neither under sufficient scrutiny from, nor of particular concern to, senior managers. This lack of engagement, compounded by unprofessional conduct such as in-fighting, reduced the likelihood of detention staff seeking SMT advice or sharing concerns. It also reduced the ability of SMT members to recognise and to act proactively upon behavioural and cultural issues. I am therefore recommending that contractors managing IRCs ensure that senior managers are more accessible to other staff.
Recommendation 25: Improving the visibility of senior managers within centres

Contractors operating immigration removal centres must ensure that senior managers are regularly present and visible within the immigration removal centre and are accessible to more junior detention staff.

Home Office staff at Brook House

  1. During the relevant period, the Home Office was represented on site at Brook House by a single team, comprising one Immigration Manager/Contract Monitor, two Deputy Immigration Managers/Contract Monitors, and seven or eight Contract Managers.89
  2. Home Office staff based at Brook House sat in an office on the third floor above the visits area.90 Mr Lake recalled having “no working relationship with the Home Office. They would enter the building via the main reception and take the lift to the top floor.91 The office was not accessible to detained people, and those wishing to speak with a Home Office representative would book a meeting, to be held in the visits area.92
  3. The lack of interaction with detained people during the relevant period is also indicative of a general ‘hands-off’ culture. A number of detained people felt that contact with Home Office staff was limited. D1851 said:

“they tend to call you when they have got bad news for you … it’s not actually speaking, it’s more of handing you documents, reminding you… ‘Don’t forget, we will be picking you up one day.’93

Detention staff, particularly DCOs, also described Home Office staff as physically distant from detained people and “very rarely” seen.94 Mr Saunders noted that Mr Paul Gasson (Home Office Contract Monitor at Brook House during the relevant period) “wouldn’t go out … wouldn’t talk to the detainees”.95 Mr Gasson stated that he did in fact spend time walking around Brook House, but the examples he gave the Inquiry involved more superficial issues such as bins being emptied and a formulaic concern with monitoring Reception waiting times.96

  1. This reflected the primary focus of the Home Office’s efforts at Brook House on ‘engagement’ work. This included serving paperwork on behalf of caseworkers, meeting various targets related to induction and ensuring that detained people could speak to the Home Office within a set time frame. Complaints boxes were emptied by a team that also undertook ad hoc inspections of Brook House, led by Mr Gasson.97 The Home Office staff were “essentially act[ing] as the middle person”, passing information and paperwork (including removal directions) between detained people and caseworkers.98
  2. Home Office staff at Brook House were not caseworkers or decision- makers, and therefore were of limited assistance to detained people.99 D687 expressed the frustration this caused:

“you never see your caseworker and the person giving you your report can’t answer any of your questions”.100

The Inquiry heard D687’s account of an interaction with a Home Office employee, Ms Vanessa Smith, who was visiting him prior to his planned removal. Ms Smith had recorded on D687’s General Case Information Database notes that D687 said he would only return to Somalia “in a body bag” and could not “take it anymore”.101 He had also started to write a suicide note. In response, she warned G4S staff but did not open an ACDT document.101 D687 recalled her telling him things like “I’m just a messenger … you’ll need to lump it and deal with it … I’m not your caseworker, so can’t help you.102 Ms Smith told the Inquiry she would have explained that she was “between” the detained person and their caseworker, but did not use the words D687 described, and did not feel she was dismissive.103 She said she did not personally open an ACDT document in response to the suicidal comments because “He didn’t say he was going to do it immediately” (adding that she “assumed” she would now open one in a similar situation).104

  1. Alongside the detachment between decision-makers and Home Office staff on the ground, there was a lack of concern by some for the welfare of those detained at Brook House. In 2018, Mr Saunders said that, while some individuals in the Home Office cared very much, “the Home Office didn’t really care about the people we looked after … the Home Office entity corporately was mostly concerned about the removal process and the functionality of it”.105 Mr Hanford similarly noted that, when he started in 2016, there were “elements of criticism aimed at G4S … from the Home Office, about showing too much empathy, supporting detainees in their appeals and the likes”.106
  2. The lack of Home Office staff at Brook House gave the impression of detachment and a lack of concern felt by both centre staff and detained people. Had the Home Office staff been more present and actively involved, there might have also been opportunities to identify and challenge poor culture and behaviour, and to better assess the welfare of detained people. I am therefore recommending that the Home Office take action to improve the visibility of its staff within Brook House.
Recommendation 26: Improving the visibility of Home Office staff

The Home Office must ensure that its staff are regularly present and visible within each immigration removal centre.


  1. Callum Tulley 29 November 2021 107/8-12; Ioannis Paschali 24 February 2022 32/24-25; Daniel Haughton 16 March 2022 99/2-18[]
  2. INQ000052 para 71; Dominic Aitken 8 December 2021 64/4-22; Ioannis Paschali 24 February 2022 32/21-25[]
  3. Shane Farrell 8 March 2022 83/9-22; Stephen Webb 8 March 2022 146/19-147/8[]
  4. Ryan Bromley 7 March 2022 88/14-15, 89/2-7; Ian Castle 15 March 2022 9/17-22; Stephen Loughton 1 March 2022 75/24-76/3[]
  5. Sean Sayers 10 March 2022 121/18-122/17[]
  6. Julian Williams 16 March 2022 48/19-49/15; Stephen Webb 8 March 2022 140/9-11; HOM0332049 para 42[]
  7. INQ000064 paras 4.10-4.11; Julian Williams 16 March 2022 48/19-23, 49/11-15; Daniel Lake 1 March 2022 16/5-14[]
  8. VER000223_20; Sarah Newland 21 March 2022 190/4-191/2[]
  9. SER000453 para 84[][]
  10. SER000453 para 85; Daniel Haughton 16 March 2022 93/7-23[]
  11. Daniel Haughton 16 March 2022 97/2-15[]
  12. Ben Saunders 22 March 2022 176/14-24, 180/3-6[][]
  13. Ben Saunders 22 March 2022 181/18-183/5[]
  14. Peter Neden 22 March 2022 34/2-5[]
  15. Peter Neden 22 March 2022 33/18-34/1[]
  16. Peter Neden 22 March 2022 34/2-5; INQ000119 para 95[]
  17. Peter Neden 22 March 2022 38/19-39/6[]
  18. Daniel Haughton 16 March 2022 95/15-23[]
  19. Daniel Haughton 16 March 2022 91/16-92/10[]
  20. HOM0332049 para 41[]
  21. Jeremy Petherick 21 March 2022 147/22-148/18[]
  22. HOM0332049 para 41; SER000453 para 85; Daniel Haughton 16 March 2022 93/7-23[]
  23. SER000453_021 para 84[]
  24. DL0000175_030 para 3.10; DL0000175_031[]
  25. For example, there are 10 Detention Operations Managers (DOMs) and 75 DCOs on weekdays (daytime), 9 DOMs and 76 DCOs on weekends (daytime) and 2 DOMs and 18 DCOs overnight (see SER000451_008 paras 27-28). DOMs were previously known as Detention Custody Managers (DCMs[]
  26. Mary Molyneux 25 March 2022 168/3-14[]
  27. Stephen Webb 8 March 2022 139/23-140/14; BDP000002_003 para 8; BDP0000003_011-12 paras 34-35[]
  28. Ryan Bromley 7 March 2022 88/14-15, 89/2-7; Ian Castle 15 March 2022 9/17-22; Stephen Loughton 1 March 2022 75/24-76/3; Sean Sayers 10 March 2022 121/18-122/17[]
  29. CJS0073709_097-098 para 8.6[]
  30. VER000266 para 66[]
  31. CJS0073709_098 para 8.8[]
  32. KEN000001 para 90; CJS0074041 para 32[]
  33. KEN000001 para 84; KEN000001 para 87. During the relevant period, DCOs were paid between £22,000 and £24,000 per year[]
  34. KEN000001 para 85[]
  35. SER000453 para 137[]
  36. INN000007 para 137[]
  37. SER000453 para 136[]
  38. SER000436 para 47[]
  39. For example, Daniel Small 28 February 2022 107/21-108/18; Daniel Lake 1 March 2022 2/10-3/15; Charles Francis 3 March 2022 17/2-3, 18/9-19; Darren Tomsett 7 March 2022 2/16-3/19; Shayne Munroe 4 March 2022 3/17-4/16[]
  40. Charles Francis 3 March 2022 17/2-19/3; Daniel Haughton 16 March 2022 154/21-24; Shayne Munroe 4 March 2022 4/11-16[]
  41. MAR000001_2 para 6[]
  42. Charles Francis 3 March 2022 18/23-19/3[]
  43. KEN000001_019-020 paras 100-103[]
  44. INN000007_005 para 17[]
  45. SER000434_008 para 30[]
  46. Owen Syred 7 December 2021 89/9-20[]
  47. Closing Statement on behalf of Owen Syred, Brook House Inquiry, 2 May 2022, paras 85-86[]
  48. Aaron Stokes 9 March 2022 169/8-12; VER000238_009 para 121; Ioannis Paschali 24 February 2022 15/7-13; VER000238_009 para 121; MIL000003_004 para 20; Stephen Webb 8 March 2022 139/23-140/14[]
  49. Christopher Donnelly 23 March 2022 65/23-66/13; Darren Tomsett 7 March 2022 13/24-14/13; INN000013_003 para 10[]
  50. MAR000001_003 para 23[]
  51. Ioannis Paschali 24 February 2022 31/19-32/17[]
  52. Daniel Small 28 February 2022 113/22-114/22; SER000434_008 para 30[]
  53. Daniel Lake 1 March 2022 12/1-7[]
  54. INQ000052_017 para 73[]
  55. DL0000175_031; SER000451_006 para 20[]
  56. Steven Hewer 1 April 2022 41/24-25. The Detention Operations Manager salary was £32,585.88 on 1 March 2022 (SER000451_010 para 40[]
  57. Steven Hewer 1 April 2022 42/11-18[]
  58. Daniel Haughton 16 March 2022 154/13-155/7[]
  59. DL0000175_0007 para 14[]
  60. CJS0074041_012 para 48[]
  61. CJS0074041_012-016 paras 48-70. A breakdown of the training involved is set out by Professor Bosworth in her first report to the Inquiry: INQ000064_030 para 5.6; CJS006085[]
  62. CJS0074041_016 para 70[]
  63. INQ000114_004 para 18; Owen Syred 7 December 2021 6/24[]
  64. CJS0073709_013 para 1.38[]
  65. CJS0074041_015 paras 62-65; CJS0074041_015-016 paras 66-67[]
  66. Professor Mary Bosworth 29 March 2022 23/16-23[]
  67. John Connolly 2 March 2022 156/19-157/8[]
  68. For example, Owen Syred 7 December 2021 46/2-23; Daniel Small 28 February 2022 109/6-110/15; Charles Francis 3 March 2022 6/5-8; David Webb 3 March 2022 105/14-106/6; Shayne Munroe4 March 2022 7/23-25; Darren Tomsett 7 March 2022 22/15-25; Stephen Loughton 1 March 2022  102/11-103/13; Shane Farrell 8 March 2022 79/13-81/1; Steven Dix 9 March 2022 6/2-5; Ioannis  Paschali 24 February 2022 29/9-16. See also INQ000064_030 para 5.6[]
  69. Owen Syred 7 December 2021 46/2-23. DCO Stewart Povey-Meier also accepted this was a possible consequence of the lack of training (Stewart Povey-Meier 17 March 2022 5/8-12[]
  70. The Brook House IMB had recommended in its 2017 and 2018 annual reports that staff working with vulnerable detained people receive appropriate ‘Advanced mental health training’ (VER000138_005; IMB000156_005). See also the Medical Justice report in 2013 on Mental Health in Immigration Detention (BHM000041_013-014 paras 36-37) and DCO Charles Francis (HOW000001_006 para 9; HOW000001_024 para 25a[]
  71. Owen Syred 7 December 2021 59/25-60/19; VER000219_002[]
  72. INQ000123_004-005 paras 2.5-2.11[]
  73. David Webb 3 March 2022 121/23-24; Shayne Munroe (INN000013_011 paras 33-34[]
  74. See, for example, Steven Dix 9 March 2022 76/1-4[]
  75. Nathan Ring 25 February 2022 5/9-6/23; Darren Tomsett 7 March 2022 4/1-9; Steven Dix 9 March 2022 4/4-20[]
  76. Jonathan Collier 30 March 2022 57/25-59/4[]
  77. INQ000123_017 paras 3.15-3.19. Mr Syred also suggested that a National Vocational Qualification in a custodial discipline would improve career progression, retention and staff morale (INN000007_059 para 221[]
  78. INQ000123_012 para 2.69[]
  79. SER000351[]
  80. INN000007_006 para 21; Daniel Lake 1 March 2022 8/24-9/15; Callum Tulley 30 November 2021 158/2; INN000013_005 para 15; SER000459_009 para 43; MAR000002_006 para 47[]
  81. Derek Murphy 2 March 2022 4/9-10[]
  82. Derek Murphy 2 March 2022 5/5-8; INQ000087_003[]
  83. Ben Saunders 22 March 2022 85/2-14, 87/17-88/1[]
  84. Stephen Skitt 17 March 2022 93/24-94/12[]
  85. Edmund Fiddy 7 March 2022 157/16-20[]
  86. Ben Saunders 22 March 2022 108/4-25[]
  87. Ben Saunders 22 March 2022 108/4-25[]
  88. INQ000123_021 para 4.22; INQ000064_031 para 6.3[]
  89. HOM0332004 para 5[]
  90. Michelle Smith 23 March 2022 102/7-10[]
  91. BDP000002_008 para 23[]
  92. HOM0332141 para 10[]
  93. D1851 3 December 2021 76/14-22[]
  94. INQ000052_028 para 119; see also INN000013_020 para 61[]
  95. VER000226_040 para 570[]
  96. Paul Gasson 15 March 2022 152/4-155/2[]
  97. Michelle Smith 23 March 2022 115/24-116/5[]
  98. HOM0332141_011 para 40; Paul Gasson 15 March 2022 221/6-13[]
  99. IMB000203_013 para 40[]
  100. DPG000021_062-063 para 172; see also HOM0332141 para 40; Jamie Macpherson 8 December 2021 206/3-16[]
  101. HOM032193_001[][]
  102. DPG000021_062-063 para 172[]
  103. Vanessa Smith 15 March 2022 247/4-16[]
  104. Vanessa Smith 15 March 2022 249/8-250/23[]
  105. VER000226_020 para 249; see also INN000007_023 para 98[]
  106. VER000266_022 para 288[]