HM Inspectorate of Prisons

41. HMIP is the sole statutory body responsible for conducting inspections of Brook House. The statutory purpose of its inspections of IRCs is to report on the treatment of detained people and on conditions in detention centres.¹ Dr Singh Bhui described the purposes of an HMIP inspection of a centre such as Brook House as including making sure that “nothing is hidden”, that the experiences of people in detention are publicised, and that if centres are not doing well enough these things are highlighted and improved upon.²
42. The Inquiry focused on HMIP’s inspections in 2016 and 2019 and its work between and after that period. However, Brook House was also inspected by HMIP in 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2022.³

Process

43. The assessment criteria used by HMIP are set out in its Expectations document.⁴ IRCs are assessed against four ‘healthy establishment’ tests: for safety, respect, activities, and preparation for removal and release. Each of these is broken down into more detailed descriptions of the standards of treatment and conditions expected, with indicators listed for whether they are being met.
44. HMIP’s inspection methodology is set out in an Inspection Framework document.⁵ The following aspects of HMIP’s process were particularly relevant.

44.1 Triangulation: One part of HMIP’s methodology is that inspectors seek to triangulate evidence before reaching findings, meaning that a source of evidence should be supported by at least two other sources.⁶ This was criticised in a paper by the Strategic Public Law Clinic as leading to “systemic unfairness”, because three of the five sources of evidence⁷ considered by HMIP are institutional sources.⁸ Dr Singh Bhui’s response was that HMIP can still mention single pieces of evidence, but that triangulation is about ensuring that findings are rigorously sourced.⁹

44.2 Frequency and timing of inspections: IRCs are subject to inspection at least once every four years, but usually more often. The timing of an inspection will depend on information received about possible risk – a planned inspection might be brought forward if HMIP becomes aware of issues such as multiple reports of disorder, violence, abuse or self- harm.¹⁰

44.3 Unannounced: I was satisfied that inspections were in fact unannounced.¹¹ Mr Tulley gave evidence to the Inquiry that he knew that the 2016 inspection was coming as he had been told a couple of days before. However, it is likely that this was because HMIP had already completed the first week of its inspection and he was being told about it in advance, or at the time, of the second week.¹²

44.4 Length and nature of inspections: At the time of HMIP’s 2016 inspection, inspections lasted two weeks.((It changed to a three-week process as part of the enhanced methodology after the Panorama programme ¹³ In week 1, inspectors would gather the views of detained people and a coordinating inspector had a “very quick look around” to see if there were any immediate issues.¹⁴ The safeguarding inspector assessed how vulnerable detained people had been treated on the basis of the records.¹⁵ A selection of detained people were offered interviews and some staff members would be spoken to.¹⁶ At the end of the first week, a pre-inspection report was prepared.¹⁷ In week 2, the full inspection team liaised with third-party organisations, reviewed additional documents, and further engaged with staff and detained people.¹⁸ Inspectors sought to triangulate evidence. On the final day, key findings and conclusions were presented verbally, followed shortly afterwards by a written debrief.

44.5 Work done during inspections: Both Reverend Nathan Ward (former Head of Tinsley House) and Mr Tulley gave evidence suggesting that, after the first week, “extensive work” would be done by senior management within Brook House to ensure the best possible outcome. This included portraying Brook House in a way that was not accurate in relation to staffing levels and ensuring that staff were on their “best behaviour” in front of inspectors.¹⁹ According to Reverend Ward, the phrase Mr Saunders would use was: “If the Queen was coming around your house for tea, you would get the best china out.”²⁰Dr Singh Bhui said that such work was of limited effectiveness, as inspectors factored it into their assessments and would hear if things had changed only in the past few days.²¹ Mr Saunders said that, although G4S was keen to present the best of what it did to HMIP, managers did not take artificial steps such as transferring detained people out of E Wing or transferring in extra staff, as Mr Tulley had alleged.²² Given these conflicting accounts, I am unable to reach any firm conclusion as to whether deliberate steps were taken to deceive inspectors.

44.6 Fact-checking: Once HMIP finalised its report internally, it was sent to the Home Office (which would liaise with the contractor) for fact- checking.²³ Dr Singh Bhui explained that this was done to present an accurate report and to avoid the risk of it being undermined, not to allow the Home Office to dispute HMIP’s conclusions.²⁴ When the draft 2016 HMIP inspection report was sent to the Home Office for fact-checking, one inspector felt that a suggested change was made by the Home Office as “an attempt to insulate their decision making from legal challenge”.²⁵ Dr Singh Bhui felt that the Home Office’s approach was inappropriately defensive and insufficiently focused on HMIP’s concerns.²⁶

44.7 Recommendations: HMIP is unable to compel the Home Office or a contractor to accept recommendations,²⁷ which Dr Singh Bhui thought helped to ensure HMIP’s independence. At the time of his evidence to the Inquiry, he considered that recommendations and findings were taken “pretty seriously” by the Home Office, describing a change from a previously “very defensive” attitude in 2016.²⁸ Dr Singh Bhui thought that this was due to a change in personnel.²⁹While this is a positive development, it is concerning that the Home Office’s response to HMIP’s recommendations may depend on personnel changes. In practice, under 50 per cent of recommendations from each inspection of Brook House were classified by HMIP as having been achieved by the next inspection.³⁰ The Home Office accepted that, in the past, it did not have sufficient dedicated staffing in IRCs to ensure that recommendations were being delivered. It says that it does now and that the new Serco contract also requires Serco to implement recommendations.³¹ Mr Philip Riley, Director of DES within the Home Office, accepted in oral evidence that, at times, the Home Office needed to move faster on recommendations, and he described the situation as a “work in progress”.³² In my view, it is inherent to the appropriately limited function of an inspectorate that it cannot enforce adherence to its recommendations. The onus is on the Home Office and its contractors to respond properly to recommendations and to accept them wherever feasible.

Activity outside inspections

45. Dr Singh Bhui described HMIP’s role in relation to Brook House between inspections as “very minimal”, explaining that its task was to conduct occasional deep-dive inspections rather than regular monitoring.³³ HMIP receives some information (described sometimes as ‘intelligence’) from various sources between inspections, but my impression is that this is sporadic and, in the main, relies on an individual or organisation deciding to raise a matter with HMIP.³⁴)
46. No intelligence about poor treatment was sent to HMIP during the relevant period. Outside the relevant period, there were two examples.

46.1 In 2015, a doctor was concerned that G4S was flouting guidance and compromising patient care by failing to remove detained people’s restraints during hospital escorts.³⁵ Although HMIP responded expressing concern and asking for consent to pass the doctor’s email to the Home Office, Dr Singh Bhui believed that such consent was never received and therefore the email was not passed on.³⁶

46.2 In May 2018, a new employee at Brook House, who had staff shadowing him after having been on the wing for only a week, informed HMIP that a female member of staff had been sexually assaulted by a detained person, that they were very short-staffed and that Brook House was “out of control and volatile”.³⁷ HMIP passed this information to the Brook House IMB, which followed it up with the Home Office and G4S senior management within Brook House.³⁸

The 2016 inspection of Brook House

47. The 2016 inspection assessed Brook House as being ‘reasonably good’ against all of its ‘healthy establishment’ tests: for safety, respect, activities, and preparation for removal and release.³⁹ In my view, the inspection report was overly positive in places.

47.1 Overly positive introduction: The introduction to the inspection report described it overall as being an “encouraging inspection” and noted that there had been “excellent progress” from when Brook House first opened. However, it also referred to major concerns about the physical environment and said that HMIP had made a number of detailed recommendations about the treatment of detained people.⁴⁰ Although ‘reasonably good’ in fact means “evidence of adverse outcomes for detainees in only a small number of areas”, Mr Saunders took it to be a “very positive report”.⁴¹ As discussed above, G4S and the Home Office bear the primary responsibility for over-relying on HMIP’s inspections and for interpreting them too favourably. However, HMIP’s characterisation of the 2016 inspection as an “encouraging inspection” was too positive, given the contents of the report and the other information available to inspectors.

47.2 Governance of use of force: Overall, HMIP reported that governance of use of force was very good and that all incidents of force were reviewed by a manager.⁴² In my view, it is unlikely that sufficient and adequate reviews were being carried out by G4S at the time of HMIP’s 2016 inspection, given my conclusions about the relevant period in Chapter D.7. It is more likely that HMIP did not identify this issue and inadequately scrutinised the governance of use of force. There is no reference to weekly or monthly Use of Force Committee or scrutiny meetings in the HMIP report. On balance, I think it is likely that they were not being carried out.⁴³ Although Dr Singh Bhui thought that HMIP did not mention these meetings because they were being carried out, the Inquiry did not see any positive evidence to suggest that they were occurring at the time of the inspection.⁴⁴

47.3 Mental health training: On healthcare more broadly, HMIP described it as “commendable” that more than half of DCOs had received mental health awareness training as part of their staff induction.⁴⁵ This was an overly positive interpretation, which Dr Singh Bhui accepted, given that “half the staff not being trained is not good enough”.⁴⁶

48. There were also areas in which HMIP was critical, but it did not go far enough.

48.1 Use of force: HMIP reviewed the use of force at Brook House by looking at a sample of forms and video recordings.⁴⁷ It was noted that the number of use of force incidents had increased since the last inspection and that video footage revealed mixed practice, including some incidents that showed unnecessary and excessive force.⁴⁸ Despite this, the only recommendation was a generic one – “All use of force should be necessary, proportionate and competently applied” – rather than anything that recommended changes to be made to achieve that outcome.⁴⁹ G4S’s response merely set out what the position should have been: “Any use of restraint, including equipment, is only used where it is necessary, reasonable and proportionate having regard to the relevant circumstances.”⁵⁰ This was evidently untrue, as demonstrated by HMIP’s own findings and even more so by my findings throughout this Report (and particularly in Part C in Volume I). As discussed in Chapter D.7, the problem of unnecessary and excessive use of force continued or increased during the relevant period.

48.2 Rule 35: Although there were some criticisms of Rule 35 reports and the Home Office’s responses to them, HMIP gave an incorrect definition of Rule 35.⁵¹ It also made no reference, in the 2016 HMIP inspection report, to the fact that there had been no reports under Rule 35(2) and few reports under Rule 35(1), although this should have been apparent.⁵² This situation was subsequently identified in the 2019 HMIP inspection report, when HMIP started to hone in on the discrepancy between the large number of detained people on constant watch and the absence of Rule 35(2) reports, although HMIP still failed to identify the lack of Rule 35(1) reports.⁵³

49. Additionally, there were some areas in which HMIP’s criticisms provide useful context for the state of Brook House during the relevant period.

49.1 In the introduction to the 2016 HMIP inspection report, HMIP warned that the proposal to use a third bed installed in 60 cells would lead to a decline in living standards.⁴⁰ No specific recommendation was made because, according to Dr Singh Bhui, this was only a potential future outcome.⁵⁴ As set out in Chapter D.3 of this Report, these beds were brought into use in 2017. Dr Singh Bhui was noted as having said in October 2017: “Having three detainees in a cell is ‘playing with fire’ but means G4S will make more money from the contract.”⁵⁵ In oral evidence, he suggested that his concerns were due to overcrowding and ventilation.⁵⁶

49.2 One of HMIP’s main concerns was the physical environment in which detained people lived. The 2016 HMIP inspection report noted lack of ventilation, detained people being locked in cells overnight, ingrained dirt, no curtains in many cells and many toilets in an unsanitary condition.⁵⁷ It recommended concerted action in this regard, which was “partially accepted” by the Home Office and G4S.⁵⁸ Dr Singh Bhui described the response as not being very convincing, and he said that he thought that many parts of the action plan were more about managing HMIP rather than focusing on what could be done to improve matters.⁵⁹ In fact, HMIP has made recommendations on issues such as cleaning, toilets, curtains, ventilation and lock-in timings in every inspection since 2010.⁶⁰ Many HMIP recommendations were rejected or responded to inadequately by the Home Office.⁶¹ The issues continued during the relevant period, as discussed in Chapter D.3.

49.3 HMIP also made significant criticisms of the approach to vulnerable detained people, including the lack of oversight, failure to determine the impact of detention on mental health and lack of training.⁶²

50. Aside from my concerns about the view taken by HMIP on certain issues at Brook House, I consider that, in a number of places, the 2016 HMIP inspection report did not adequately reflect some of the adverse evidence about Brook House that was obtained by HMIP.

50.1 Detained people feeling unsafe: Although 37 per cent of detained people surveyed by HMIP said that they felt unsafe at Brook House, Dr Singh Bhui told the Inquiry that this level was not unusual and no recommendations were made about it.⁶³ While I understand the rationale for measuring the welfare of detained people against a baseline of respondents at other IRCs, it is objectively concerning that more than a third of detained people reported feeling unsafe. I was not convinced by Dr Singh Bhui’s suggestion that one of the reasons for this may be psychological insecurity about the prospect of removal.⁶⁴The context of the survey questions suggests that ‘unsafe’ is more likely to refer to feeling victimised, threatened or intimidated by staff or other detained people.⁶⁵ G4S said that it conducted further surveys to monitor how safe detained people felt.⁶⁶ One such survey in 2017 recorded that 45 detained people (35 per cent of people who responded) felt unsafe or very unsafe in Brook House.⁶⁷

50.2 Detained people reporting physical and verbal abuse: HMIP’s survey identified that 22 people said they had been ‘victimised’ (either insulted or assaulted) by a member of staff and that four said they had been physically abused by a member of staff.⁶⁸ While I acknowledge the difficulty of following up responses given as part of an anonymous survey, the fact that four people alleged physical abuse by staff, as part of a snapshot survey, should have caused greater concern on the part of HMIP and should have merited greater prominence in its report.

50.3 Lack of staff: HMIP recorded evidence that “Lack of staff makes it harder for them to pick up on warning signs”, as well as that staff retention had been a challenge.⁶⁹ Neither issue was included by HMIP in its report. Dr Singh Bhui thought that, if staffing had been a major concern at the time of the inspection, it would have emerged “quite strongly from other evidence”.⁷⁰ However, there were signs that there was or had been a lack of staff.⁷¹ Even though there was a temporary increase due to Tinsley House closing for refurbishment and staff moving over to Brook House, HMIP should have flagged the temporary nature of this and identified the issues with staffing levels prior to its inspection.⁷²

50.4 Attitudes of staff: HMIP also noted in its record of group interviews with detained people that “most staff quite good, but some rude and don’t take detainees seriously”.1⁷³ According to Dr Singh Bhui, this was not included in the report because of other evidence suggesting that detained people found staff to be respectful and due to the lack of further evidence in this regard.⁷⁴ In my view, the inclusion of the more negative information would have provided the fullest possible picture of what detained people had told inspectors.

50.5. Approach to complaints: The group interviews also revealed that one or more detained people said that they had “No faith in complaints system”.⁷³ Additionally, according to HMIP’s survey, less than half of detained people who said that they had been victimised by other detained people or by staff had reported it.⁷⁵ Despite this, neither of these matters were included in HMIP’s report on the issue of complaints.⁷⁶ Dr Singh Bhui agreed that, in hindsight, HMIP should have reached a conclusion that there was not enough faith in the complaints system, and it should have reported what detained people were saying about the complaints system.⁷⁷

50.6 Attitudes of Healthcare staff, including approach to self-harm: One of the observations from the group interviews was that “Healthcare staff can be abrupt or rude and quality of treatment can be poor”.⁷³G4S’s initial response was that it was “not aware of particular problems with healthcare. For mental health care have an RMN [Registered Mental Health Nurse] always on duty”, which did not show a great deal of reflection.⁷⁸These comments were not included by HMIP in its report. One detained person said in the anonymous survey that “the nurses are very rude and very bad people” and that “people try to hang [themselves] and they say he’s faking it who would fake something like that … the Home Office and G4S are very bad people”.⁷⁹ Despite this, HMIP concluded that “all incidents of self-harm were well investigated”, which Dr Singh Bhui explained as referring to all of the cases it looked at in detail.⁸⁰ He said that HMIP does not include individual comments that it does not think represent the overarching position.⁸¹ The difficulty with this approach is that it can lead to significant issues not being identified in the report. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter D.8, the evidence the Inquiry heard suggested a culture within Healthcare in which doctors and nurses characterised behaviour as wilfully disobedient and obstructive, instead of countenancing the idea that the behaviour may have been a manifestation of mental anguish or ill health. This attitude accords with the allegation of a detained person being accused of “faking it”.

51. One of the main reasons why many of these issues were not included in the report appears to be HMIP’s approach to triangulation. Contrary to what HMIP told the Inquiry in its Closing Statement, on some occasions single sources of evidence were not sufficiently taken into account.⁸² Although HMIP insisted that its approach is a strength of the process, Dr Singh Bhui accepted that HMIP could do better in reporting what detained people say.⁸³ He suggested that HMIP was thinking, in the future, of including what detained people had told inspectors, and then going on to explain whether HMIP agrees with those claims or, if not, why it cannot find other evidence to support them.⁸⁴ In my view, this would be a huge improvement on the current approach of excluding individual criticisms or complaints if supportive evidence cannot be found. HMIP’s 2022 report did give some prominence to the reported experiences of detained people, although, as the Inquiry has not seen the underlying evidence, it is not possible to be sure that all significant issues raised by detained people were included.⁸⁵
52. Although there are inherent limitations to what can be identified during a two-week inspection, the 2016 HMIP inspection report overall did not properly reflect the evidence HMIP obtained of the experiences of detained people. HMIP’s methodology at the time of the 2016 inspection was not sufficiently sensitive to the needs of an IRC. In such settings, signs of abuse may be more difficult to identify because of factors such as language barriers, a high turnover of detained people and detained people’s fear of speaking out because of the perceived risk of it having an impact on their immigration case. Higher staffing levels at the time of the inspection may also have made things appear better than they were during the relevant period.⁸⁶

Reaction to the Panorama programme and changes made by HM Inspectorate of Prisons

53. HMIP said that it was “very concerned” about the behaviour shown in the Panorama programme. Dr Singh Bhui’s view was that it became clear that there was a “pernicious sub-culture” whereby staff were able to treat detained people badly without colleagues challenging them or whistleblowing.⁸⁷ He noted that “there was not only a few individuals who were behaving badly”, but also “other people who knew they were behaving badly but said nothing”.⁸⁸
54. Dr Singh Bhui said that HMIP did not find evidence of the type of behaviour shown in the Panorama programme.⁸⁹ However, as outlined above, HMIP did have the following:

• evidence of four detained people saying that they had been physically assaulted by a member of staff;
• evidence of 22 people saying that they had felt victimised (assaulted or insulted) by staff, including in seven instances where the respondent believed that the victimisation was because of their nationality;⁶⁵
• a finding that the supply and misuse of drugs were “the most significant threat to security” in Brook House;⁹⁰
• allegations that some staff were rude;
• allegations that some Healthcare staff did not believe detained people;
• evidence of detained people saying that they had no faith in the complaints system; and
• evidence of allegations against staff of racism.⁹¹

Taken together, this is broadly similar to some of the behaviour shown on the Panorama programme, but it was not highlighted as such. To the extent that HMIP was not able to identify what was shown in the Panorama programme, that reflects a limitation of the inspection process

55. In a review conducted by HMIP immediately after the Panorama programme, HMIP noted that it could improve its methodology, starting at Harmondsworth immigration removal centre, which it said “may be worse than Brook House in many ways given the large amount of intelligence received about it”.⁹²
56. Following this review, HMIP introduced an ‘enhanced methodology’, including offering every detained person a confidential interview, asking non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to encourage detained people to speak with HMIP inspectors, encouraging NGOs to speak with HMIP directly and introducing a confidential staff survey, random staff interviews and changes to the detained person survey.⁹³ In October 2017, HMIP identified that its new methodology was causing “considerable unease” in the Home Office. Dr Singh Bhui thought that this was because the Home Office felt that HMIP might “find more things and … it would all be critical”.⁹⁴ A 2020 review of the enhanced methodology found that it should continue because, despite costing more, it increased the level of scrutiny.⁹⁵ HMIP deserves credit for its swift and proactive response to the Panorama programme, and the enhanced methodology now in use is an improvement on the previous approach.⁹⁶
57. Indicators of abuse can be insidious. It is vital that oversight bodies are alert to the signs of ill treatment and that their methodologies for identifying abuse are effective. I am therefore recommending HMIP and IMBs ensure that their approaches are sufficiently robust and take account of the specific needs of the detained population.

Recommendation 33: Improving the investigation and reporting of HM Inspectorate of Prisons and Independent Monitoring Boards HM Inspectorate of Prisons and Independent Monitoring Boards working within immigration removal centres must ensure that they have robust processes for: ●  obtaining and reporting on an enhanced range of evidence and intelligence from detained people and those who represent or support them, staff and contractors, including that which is received outside of inspections or visits; and ●  reporting on any concerns about the Home Office and contractors.

The 2019 inspection of Brook House

58. In its 2019 inspection of Brook House, HMIP found that there was no evidence that an abusive culture was present and found that no assaults had been reported in confidential interviews.⁹⁷ However, this presented a somewhat misleading picture given that (as in 2016) at least four detained people reported when surveyed that they had been physically assaulted by staff.⁹⁸ Because these responses were anonymous, Dr Singh Bhui said they could not be followed up.⁹⁹
59. HMIP also reported that no Brook House staff saw any unjustified use of force and that all staff said they would report any inappropriate behaviour.¹⁰⁰ Dr Singh Bhui said that this was reporting what HMIP had been told and that “unless we can find other evidence to corroborate or disprove what they’re saying … that’s what we are left with”.¹⁰¹ Despite what staff said, it is difficult to believe that either of those things were an accurate reflection of the true position – particularly that all staff would report inappropriate behaviour – in light of the evidence the Inquiry has heard suggesting that there was no culture of reporting (as discussed in Chapter D.10).
60. However, HMIP did identify that a number of concerns remained, including about detention being maintained after Rule 35 reports, detained people being confined to cells overnight, the accommodation remaining prison- like and restraints being applied during escorts with insufficient justification.¹⁰² The fact that these concerns had not been resolved from previous inspections shows some of the limitations of HMIP’s role.

Current overview of HM Inspectorate of Prisons

61. At the time of the Inquiry’s hearings, HMIP said that it was adding a section on leadership in future reports, which it hoped would lead to more focused reporting on staffing. ¹⁰³However, no such section appears in the 2022 HMIP inspection report on Brook House.¹⁰⁴
62. At the time of the Inquiry’s hearings in March 2022, HMIP was also consulting on a change to the way in which it reports inspection findings, including a proposal no longer to make recommendations and instead to report a small number of ‘concerns’, some of which will be identified as ‘priority concerns’.¹⁰⁵ This was described as being partly in response to frustration that recommendations are not always achieved, particularly when they relate to matters that have an impact on the safety of detained people.¹⁰⁶ Dr Singh Bhui described the intention as focusing minds on the key concerns and getting managers to spend time on those, rather than creating a lengthy action plan and addressing the low-level recommendations.¹⁰⁷ In May 2022, HMIP announced that it was making the proposed changes in relation to recommendations in some of its inspections, but that piloting and consultation for immigration detention settings were ongoing.¹⁰⁸
63. In August 2022, HMIP published its most recent inspection report on Brook House.202 I have referred to its findings throughout this Report when considering current practice, but more broadly I note that HMIP:

• found that of the 12 recommendations made about key concerns in its 2019 report, one had been achieved, three partially achieved and eight not achieved;¹⁰⁹
• assessed Brook House as being ‘reasonably good’ against three of HMIP’s four ‘healthy establishment’ tests (safety, respect, and preparation for removal and release) and ‘not sufficiently good’ in relation to activities;
• noted six ‘priority concerns’, including the “unacceptably long” length of detention in some cases, that Brook House “did not provide an open or relaxed environment suitable for immigration detainees”, and that it “did not meet the needs of the high number of detainees with mental health problems”;¹¹⁰ and
• identified nine other ‘key concerns’, including poor identification and management of risks on arrival, failure to use the Rule 35 report process to its fullest extent, inadequate case management of detained people at risk of suicide or self-harm, detained people being inappropriately locked in cells overnight, insufficiently professional supervision of units by staff and insufficiently robust governance of health services.¹¹¹

64. This report did not include any recommendations, which suggests that the proposed changes have now been made to HMIP’s inspections of immigration detention settings. It is my hope that HMIP will monitor the impact of this change on IRCs specifically.

1. Prison Act 1952, section 5A(3) and section 5A(5B)(b)(ii[↩]
2. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 108/2-14[↩]
3. HMIP000685_004 para 9; Report on an Unannounced Inspection of Brook House ImmigrationRemoval Centre 30 May–16 June 2022 (HMIP000702), HM Inspectorate of Prisons, September 2022[↩]
4. HMIP000644 (2012 version); INQ000134 (2018 version[↩]
5. HMIP000643 (2016 version); HMIP000638 (2019 version[↩]
6. HMIP000685_009 para 27; HMIP000643_014 paras 3.24 and 3.25[↩]
7. The five sources of evidence as of 2016 were observation, detained person surveys, discussions with detained people, discussions with staff and relevant third parties, and documentation (HMIP000613_012 para A8[↩]
8. GDW000011_007 para 7[↩]
9. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 168/10-169/11[↩]
10. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 122/2-123/1[↩]
11. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 109/2-20. According to Dr Singh Bhui, they have been so since 2013-14[↩]
12. Callum Tulley 30 November 2021 97/22; Callum Tulley 9 March 2022 144/20; Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 116/13-117/3[↩]
13. see Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 114/13-21[↩]
14. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 110/11-25[↩]
15. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 112/6-113/19[↩]
16. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 113/20-114/6. As discussed below, after the Panorama programme, this was changed so that every detained person is offered a confidential one-to-one interview, and a mechanism was implemented for gathering views from all staff members[↩]
17. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 129/15-19; see, for example, HMIP000128[↩]
18. HMIP000685_008 para 25; HMIP000643_012-013 paras 3.15-3.21[↩]
19. Reverend Nathan Ward 7 December 2021 196/21-197/23; Callum Tulley 30 November 2021 100/14- 102/1; CPS000024_009[↩]
20. Reverend Nathan Ward 7 December 2021 197/18-21[↩]
21. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 117/22-119/3[↩]
22. Ben Saunders 22 March 2022 115/4-12[↩]
23. HMIP000685_010 para 31; see, for example, HMIP000667[↩]
24. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 181/24-182/10[↩]
25. HMIP000164_002; HMIP000667_005[↩]
26. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 184/4-8[↩]
27. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 175/8-18[↩]
28. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 185/6-15[↩]
29. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 184/17-185/15, 209/6-18[↩]
30. DL0000270_183 para 350[↩]
31. HOM0332165_061 paras 194 and 195; Philip Riley 4 April 2022 98/10[↩]
32. Philip Riley 4 April 2022 128/7-12[↩]
33. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 120/18-121/5[↩]
34. Dr Singh Bhui said that information about deaths or concerted disorder would always be sent to them (Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 122/10-14[↩]
35. HMIP000657_001[↩]
36. HMIP000658; Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 125/11-128/25[↩]
37. HMIP000690[↩]
38. HMIP000690 ; IMB000217[↩]
39. HMIP000643_009; HMIP000643_015; HMIP000613_015-019[↩]
40. HMIP000613_007[↩][↩]
41. HMIP000613_011 para A4; Ben Saunders 22 March 2022 113/8-11[↩]
42. HMIP000613_015-016[↩]
43. The latest evidence of a Use of Force Committee meeting dates from between February and June 2016 (CJS0073064_001); see also CJS0073709_207-208[↩]
44. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 137/4-9[↩]
45. HMIP000613_040 para 2.57[↩]
46. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 166/8-167/2[↩]
47. HMIP000685_022-023 para 62[↩]
48. HMIP000613_016 para S9; HMIP000613_028 para 1.53; HMIP000613_049 para 4.22[↩]
49. HMIP000613_028 para 1.58[↩]
50. VER000116_005[↩]
51. HMIP000613_030-031; Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 164/12-22[↩]
52. DL0000140_175-180[↩]
53. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 165/23-25[↩]
54. HMIP000697_006 para 18. The decision to approve the use of the 60 beds was made in January 2017 (CJS0074084[↩]
55. VER000193[↩]
56. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 173/20-174/2[↩]
57. HMIP000613_024; HMIP000613_033[↩]
58. HMIP000613_020 para S36; VER000116_001 para 5.2[↩]
59. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 153/3-11[↩]
60. DL0000167_024-025; DL0000167_052; DL0000167_055; DL0000171_013; DL0000171_051; HMIP000311_016; HMIP000311_025; HMIP000311_033; HMIP000311_046[↩]
61. DL0000270_065 para 92[↩]
62. HMIP000613_024-025 paras 1.28-1.33[↩]
63. HMIP000685_027 para 74; HMIP000685_028-029 para 78[↩]
64. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 142/20-143/11[↩]
65. HMIP000613_079[↩][↩]
66. CJS0074522_001 para 3[↩]
67. CJS0074154_004 p4, question 6[↩]
68. HMIP000613_079 paras Q50 and Q51; HMIP000685_028 para 75[↩]
69. HMIP000160_001; HMIP000128_002[↩]
70. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 150/13-15[↩]
71. HMIP000160_001; HMIP000128_002; HMIP000613_033 para 2.5[↩]
72. Callum Tulley 9 March 2022 149/10-151/5[↩]
73. HMIP000160_001[↩][↩][↩]
74. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 150/20-151/12[↩]
75. HMIP000613_079 para Q52[↩]
76. HMIP000613_036[↩]
77. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 156/18-157/18[↩]
78. HMIP000160_001 [↩]
79. HMIP000165_008[↩]
80. HMIP000613_023 para 1.21[↩]
81. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 160/21-161/14[↩]
82. HMIP000699_006 para 19[↩]
83. HMIP000699_006 para 19 [↩]
84. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 169/24-170/15[↩]
85. Report on an Unannounced Inspection of Brook House Immigration Removal Centre 30 May–16 June2022 (HMIP000702), HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, September 2022, pp3-4[↩]
86. HMIP000699_009-011 paras 29-36[↩]
87. HMIP000685_034 para 96; HMIP000671_001[↩]
88. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 186/9-17[↩]
89. HMIP000685_034 para 97[↩]
90. HMIP000613_027 para 1.46[↩]
91. HMIP000165_009; HMIP000128_005[↩]
92. HMIP000165_013[↩]
93. ese were subsequently discontinued because HMIP found that they were receiving very similar information to that received during the survey. HMIP replaced them with interviews with staff who provided information of concern and were willing to be identified (HMIP000685_037-038 para 99c; HMIP000685_035-040 paras 98-101[↩]
94. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 197/8-19; HMIP000156; HMIP000688_002[↩]
95. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 195/4-196/4; HMIP000671_003; HMIP000671_005[↩]
96. HMIP000699_002 para 3d; Reverend Nathan Ward 7 December 2021 197/8-11[↩]
97. HMIP000685_046 para 117; see also HMIP000674_015 para S12; HMIP000674_027 para 1.37; HMIP000674_030 para 1.64[↩]
98. HMIP000674_085[↩]
99. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 201/17-21[↩]
100. HMIP000674_014 para S8; HMIP000674_025 para 1.23; HMIP000674_030 para 1.64[↩]
101. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 201/25-202/3[↩]
102. HMIP000685_046 para 118[↩]
103. HMIP000683_006 para 14; HMIP000639[↩]
104. In a subsequent report on a different IRC, published in December 2022, a section on ‘Leadership’ was included (Report on anUnannouncedInspection of Derwentside Immigration Removal Centre8–25 August 2022, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, December 2022[↩]
105. HMIP000685_011 para 34; From Recommendations to Concerns, HM Inspectorate of Prisons, undated[↩]
106. HMIP000683_010-012 paras 24-29[↩]
107. Dr Hindpal Singh Bhui 24 March 2022 205/17-207/12[↩]
108. From Recommendations to Concerns, HM Inspectorate of Prisons, undated[↩]
109. Report on an Unannounced Inspection of Brook House Immigration Removal Centre 30 May–16 June 2022 (HMIP000702), HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, September 2022, para 1.4[↩]
110. Report on an Unannounced Inspection of Brook House Immigration Removal Centre 30 May–16 June2022 (HMIP000702), HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, September 2022, p48[↩]
111. Report on an Unannounced Inspection of Brook House Immigration Removal Centre 30 May–16 June 2022 (HMIP000702), HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, September 2022, p49[↩]